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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

PRINCE-COVEY & COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JERRY V. STRAND,

Case No.
12964

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by PlaintiffRespondent on a contract for the sale
of securities to Defendant-Appellant.

Plaintiff-Respondent is a licensed
broker-dealer, engaging in the securities business through the regular and
customary channels of interstate commerce.

As such broker-dealer, Plaintiff-

Respondent both bought and sold various

2

securities for the account of the Defendant-Appellant.

Under the contract in

question, Plaintiff-Respondent extended
credit to Defendant-Appellant, for which
payment was not made.

Defendant-Appellant

counterclaimed against Plaintiff-Respondent for the conversion of various securities which Plaintiff-Respondent sold from
Defendant-Appellant's account, without
consent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a non-jury trial on the merits,
the trial court granted Plaintiff judgment
in the amount of $34,696.16.

The lower

court found that Defendant owed the Plaintiff $100,702.84.

Further, that Plaintiff

realized $63,267.00 from the liquidation
of Defendant's account, resulting in a
net amount due on the account by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff in the amount
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of $37,435.84.

Also, the lower court

found that Plaintiff sold securities
owned by Defendant from his account

'

without the consent of the Defendant.
It was found that the fair market

value of the converted stock within
a reasonable period of time after date

of conversion, less the amounts realized from the sale of such stock, resulted in damage to the Defendant in
the amount of $6,430.00.

This amount

was offset against the amount found
to be due from Defendant to Plaintiff,
resulting in a judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16,
which amount includes interest computed
at the rate of six per cent (6%) per
annum.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment granted Plaintiff.

If the Appellate
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Court reverses Plaintiff's Judgment, Defendant seeks judgment for $20,137.60.

If

the Appellate Court allows Plaintiff relief
then Defendant seeks review of the evidence

'

and an order of this Court fixing Plaintiff's
damages at $13,501.08, to be determined
by the conversion measure of damages,

and judgment on Defendant's counterclaim

for $20,147.60.

Offsetting those amounts,

judgment should be granted Defendant for
$6,636.52.

If.the Appellate Court affirms

the trial court on the relief granted Plaintiff, Defendant seeks a review of the
evidence supporting the counterclaim and
seeks amendment of the counterclaim judgment to Plaintiff, after appropriate offsets,
Defendant seeks an
'
award of attorney's fees and costs of
of $31,614.40.

the appeal.

Also
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a Utah Corporation, is
a licensed broker-dealer which buys and
sells securities through interstate commerce (R. 135-36).

Sometime in late

1969, Defendant opened a special cash
account with Plaintiff (Ex. 1-P & R. 136),
which account was perhaps the bi:ggest
account of Plaintiff (R. 138).

Defendant

placed orders with Plaintiff for the
purchase and sale of various stocks and
Plaintiff executed such orders until

May 18, 1970 (Exs. 1-P & 2-D, and R. 136,
201 & 239).

Plaintiff treated Defendant's account
as a COD account from about April 10 or
11, 1970 (R. 143-45).

There was no writ-

ten agreement of such COD account with

Defendant (R. 143), there was no customer
information card indicating a COD account

(R. 152), the terms of such COD account

6

were never communicated to Defendant
(R. 156-57, 178-91, & 214-15).

De-

fendant's stock was placed in a single
folder (R. 223), COD confirmations were
handled like any other confirmations
(R. 225), and such COD confirmations
had no special notation that a COD
transaction was involved (R. 2271-28).
Approximately May 19, 1970, Plaintiff received a check of Defendant in
the amount of $16,000.00, which was
returned by the bank (R. 199).

Plain-

tiff immediately commenced to liquidate
Defendant's account by selling all of
his stock, which included large blocks
of stock in Classic Mining Corporation
and Investestate (Ex. 3-P, R. 145 & 239).
At the conclusion of the liquidation,
which took approximately one month
(Exs. 2-D & 3-P and R. 145), Defendant's account had a debit balance of

7

$40,542.58 (Ex. 1-P & R. 203), which amount
included cornmiss ion charges of the liquidation (Ex. 2-D), resulting in a net debit
balance in Defendant's account of $37,435.84
(R. 78).

Defendant owned certain stocks which
were sold through the liquidation by
Plaintiff, without consent of Defendant

(R. 190 & 234).

Defendant owned 27,500

shares of Classic Mining Corporation,
700 shares of Agau Mines, 30,000 shares
of Investestate, 4,000 shares of Stans-

bury, and 2,000 shares of King Oil.
The fair market value of said stocks
within two weeks from the corrunencement
of the liquidation was $17,980.00 (Ex.

7-P & R. 235).

Plaintiff realized

$9 , l ~ 62 . 00 from the sale of said stock,
which was credited to Defendant's
account, resulting in a net loss to
the Defendant of $8,518.00 (Ex. 7-P

&

8

R. 263-64).

Allowable interest thereon

to May 11, 1972, is $993.76, thereby
entitling Defendant to judgment on
his counterclaim in the amount of
$9,511. 76.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUSTAtN ITS
BURDEN OF PROVING AN AGREEMENT, OR ANY
BREACH THEREOF, AS ALLEDGED IN ITS COMPLAINT.
Defendant had an account with Plaintiff (R. 53 & 136).
no

Plaintiff introduced

written agreement defining the kind

of account it had with Defendant, and
the testimony established there was
none

(R. 150-51).

Keith Sudbury, a trader-broker agent
for Plaintiff, testified that he assumed
Defendant's account "was a special account payable within seven days, as all
the rest of them were."

Yet he did not

know what kind of account was involved,
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since it had been set up before he went
to work for Plaintiff (R. 137 & 153).
There was no testimony from the two
principals of Plaintiff, or from anybody, as to what kind of account was
established for Defendant.

There was

no evidence of when such account was
opened, no evidence of who set up the
account, and no evidence of what, if
any, terms of such account might have
been, i.e., prices, quantities, delivery dates, limitations and restrictions
on credit, if any, payment dates, whether the account was corporate, individual,
joint tenancy, trust account, custodial
account, or what parties, if more than
one, were authorized to transact business
~

connection therewith.
On April 10 or 11, 1970 (R. 144),

Plaintiff supposedly opened a COD
account for Defendant, yet there was

10
no written agreement regarding such
COD account (R. 143).

Federal security

law does not grant authority to create
a COD account.
exists.

No such account properly

Under Regulation T, Federal

Reserve System, 12 C.F.R., Section 220.4
(c)(S), which was promulgated under Sec-

tion 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C., Section 78g(c), as
amended July 29, 1968, P.L. 90-437, 82

STAT. 452, a broker-dealer may vary from
the usual seven business days to thirtyfive calendar days to obtain payment
from a customer.

Section 220.4 of the

Federal Reserve System Regulations
covers the subject of special accounts,
with sub-paragraph (5) permitting the
broker thirty-five calendar days, rather
than the usual seven business days, in
which it must collect from a customer on
a given transaction (R. 94-97) ·
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Specifically, the Regulation requires
(1) the broker to act in good faith, (2)
the broker and the customer to have an
understanding when the broker purchases
a security for the customer under this
provision, (3) that delivery of the securities must be promptly made to customer,
(4) that full cash payment must be prompt-

ly made by customer against such delivery,
and (5) that such special accounts must
be recorded seperately and must be con-

fined to transactions and to relations
~ecifically

authorized.

The foregoing provision of the
Regulations was intended for use by
institutional accounts, or for special
situations where usual means of transmittal make impossible the physical
delivery of a given stock within a
matter of two or three days.

The test-

imony of Plaintiff indicated that a

12
COD account was created for Defendant

(R. 143), and Mr. David E. Nelson

a
'
certified public accountant, an officer
and director of Plaintiff, and one of
its principals treated Mr. Strand's
account as a COD account, notwithstanding
the clear and unmistakable limitation of
the Regulation restricting the COD collection period of thirty-five days to
individual transactions (R. 198-99).
Defendant's account was Keith
Sudbury's biggest account, and was
perhaps the biggest account of Plain1

tiff (R. 138).

According to Mr. Sudbury,

"Mr. Strand' s account produced in excess

of $20,000.00 in gross commissions . . .

in a period of about five months" (R. 139).
In fact

'

commissions on the Strand ac-

count from January 1, 1970 to May 18, 1970
amounted to $27,133.29 (Exs. 1-P & 2-D).
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Not only was it a large account (R. 138),
producing substantial and profitable
commissions (R. 139), but Defendant had
always paid promptly (R. 143).
According to David E. Nelson, who
was "responsible for all of the accounting functions of the firm, which includes
cashiering" (R. 198), Plaintiff received
1

1

a bad check from Defendant on May 19,
1970, which was returned from the bank

(R. 199).

Plaintiff demonstrated its

good faith by immediately commencing
liquidation of Defendant's account
(Exs. 1-P, 2-D & R. 145).

There was

no testimony or other evidence that
Plaintiff gave notice to Defendant, or
that any reasonable, good faith effort
was made by Plaintiff to effect recovery
on the check.

In addition, there was no testimony
or evidence as to why Defendant delivered

14
a $16,000.00 check to Plaintiff, i.e.,

what stock was involved, if any, whether
Plaintiff had delivered, or tendered
delivery of any stock to tne Defendant
or his agent, and in fact, whether

'

Plaintiff had received the appropriate
stock so that it could have delivered
• same to Defendant (R. 224).

No confir-

: mat ion, or confirmations, of the transaction or transactions relating to the
~16,000.00

were ever produced.

what $16,000.00 check?

In fact,

None was ever

offered in evidence by Plaintiff.
· Clearly it can be seen that there was
no

evidence of what, if anything, De-

fendant might have owed Plaintiff at
that time.
Mr. David E. Nelson testified that
there was a debit balance in the account
on May 18, 1970 in the amount of $84, 607. 84
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(R. 201), but there was no testimony or
evidence that such amount, or any part
thereof, was actually due from the Defendant to Plaintiff.

Mr. Nelson conceded

that had the check cleared, Defendant
would still not "have been in violation,"
i.e., the account was current (R. 209).
Not one single confirmation was produced
as evidence of what was due.
Plaintiff did not obtain Defendant's
consent to liquidate.

In fact, Defendant

had requested Keith Sudbury not to liquidate the account (R. 168).

There was no

evidence that Defendant had pledged,
hypothecated, agreed to indemnify, or
in any way granted Plaintiff contractual
authority to liquidate his account, or
any single transaction pertaining to the
account.

Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph

(c) of Section 220.4 of the Regulations
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provides that if full cash payment is
not made when due that the broker-dealer
shall "promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction."

(R. 94-97).

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, the applicable law

grants authority to a broker-dealer to
liquidate a transaction, not an account.
David E. Nelson testified that "in some
instances, the liquidation could have
occurred prior to us

[Prince-Covey]

actually receiving the stock from the
other side." (R. 224)

On a COD

transaction, payment is not due from
the customer until delivery.

Therefore,

in those instances, the account clearly
was not due.

David E. Nelson also testified
that the account was immediately charged for a purchase when Defendant placed

his purchase order (R. 208).

Plaintiff

had charged $100,702.84 to Defendant (R. 202),
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but there was no testimony or evidence
that any stock had been delivered to
Defendant.

(See, Section 70A-8-313

Utah Code Annotated, 1953.)

'

Accord-

ingly, it was impossible for the trial
court to ascertain what, if anything,
was in fact due from Defendant to Plain-

tiff thereby justifying the liquidation

' of a single stock transaction, much less
the whole account.
At the time of the liquidation,
Plaintiff's capital position or ratio
was very "precarious."

In fact, Plain-

tiff had to obtain more capital to satisfy
their net capital requirements under the
Regulations of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, of which they
Were a member (R. 192-97).
simnle
'

'

Plain and

Plaintiff was in "bad trouble."

(R. 189) Plaintiff elected to save its

18
own hide by sacrificing the Defendant.

Plaintiff well knew that Defendant had
"a ton of stock" (R. 249) in his account,

and that a total and immediate liquidation
of the account would knock the bottom out
of things .

Mr. Almon M. Covey, who was

a part-owner of Plaintiff and who was
a registered securities broker,

~ndicated

that the stocks which Defendant was dealing in were "so speculative and the market
dropped so fast that the equity declined
so fast that it was virtually overnight,
so our ratio wasn't completely adhered to
because of those circumstances" (R. 187).
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Plaintiff nonetheless went ahead with a wholesale liquidation, appreciating that as
a natural consequence of its actions,
Defendant would be greatly and irreparably
damaged.
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Plaintiff as a licensed and registered broker-dealer, engages in a highly
sophisticated and regulated business.
Such a business is at all times under
the thumb and careful scrutiny of the
Federal Reserve Board, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Utah State
Securities Commission, the Natiopal
Association of Securities Dealers,
and the local, regional and national
stock exchanges.

A broker-dealer,

such as Plaintiff, handles millions
of dollars of the general public's

money through thousand of transactions.
For a broker-dealer to manage such
responsibility, it necessarily must
have a highly refined accounting system,
With the capacity to collate, organize,
store and retrieve on relatively short
~ice.

20
As a certified public accountant

'

and

as a principal of Plaintiff, Mr. Nelson was
certainly in a position to closely monitor
and supervise the whole accounting function of the Plaintiff.

Notwithstanding

the fact that very substantial sums of
money were involved in this litigation,
with extremely important results: to
the rights of both parties being involved, David E. Nelson testified it
was too much of a job to pull the confirmations (R. 224).
Plaintiff's system was adequate
enough to retrieve confirmations on
both sides of a March 31, 1970 transaction wherein Defendant purchased
2,000 shares Investestate (Ex. 4-P &
5-P).

It is patently apparent that

Plaintiff could have provided confirmations on every transaction with the

21
Defendant, since such confirmations were
filed by the Plaintiff in numerical sequence
by transaction number (R. 244).

Plaintiff's

computer run on the account for the period
in question contains a full list of the
transaction numbers (Ex. 1-P).

David E.

Nelson admitted that he could pull all
of the confirmations, if necessary (R. 224).
It is respectfully submitted that
it was necessary for Plaintiff to provide
all of the confirmations in question.
Sub-section (2) of paragraph (a) of Section 220.4 of the Federal Reserve Regulations requires that each special account
must be recorded seperately.

Plaintiff

did not even pay lip service to such requirement since it accounted for all
transactions in account No. 01-182048-009
(Exs.

1-P, 2-D & R. 203-4).

This was

done notwithstanding the distinct differ-
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ence between the usual special account
seven day business credit period and
the COD transactions with their thirtyfive calendar day credit period.

Plain-

tiff co-mingled all of Defendant's stocks
both owned by him and purchased by him
on the special cash account, including
COD transactions, in a single fiie

(R. 224).

Considering that all pur-

chases were posted to Defendant's
account immediately (R. 208), and that
liquidation could have occured prior to
Plaintiff's actual receipt of stock
from other brokerage firms (R. 224),
thus making delivery impossible,
there was no possible way for the trial
court to determine the amount due without written confirmations thereof.
Not only was it impossible from
the record to know what kind of account

'
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was involved, but it became apparent
that there was some doubt as to whose
account was involved.

Keith Sudbury

testified that some Agau stock was
available for $6. 00, and he bought
2,000 shares of said stock for some
other parties and charged the $12,260.00
purchase price to the Strand accpunt
May 12, 1970 (R. 175-76). l
1 navid E. Nelson testified the 2,000
shares of Agau were part of the Strand
liquidation (R. 206). It is apparent
from Exhibit 2-D that Plaintiff did not
reverse (R. 206) the $12,260.00 debit
from the Strand account until after the
liquidation was completed. Note on
Exhibit 2-D the debit balance of the
Strand account of $44,545.38. Compare
that with the adjusted debit balance
~ Exhibit 3-P of $40,542.58.
It readily
can be seen that the large debit balance
of Defendant's account on May 18, 1970,
was greatly increased by Plaintiff's own
shenanigans. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
own debit balance figured in its decision
to commence liquidation of Defendant's
account.
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POINT II
PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES WAS NOT
APPLIED BY TRIAL COURT TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiff's action is predicated
upon the charge of $100,702.84 to Defendant's account before May 18, 1970

(R. 202).

Said charges were immediately

. posted to Defendant's account when he
placed a purchase order (R. 208).
However, Defendant had no legal obligation to pay for the charges made until
there was actual delivery of such stock
(See, Section 70A-8-313, Utah Code 'Annotated, 1953.), i.e., a COD transaction
is one where the customer makes full cash

payment for a stock against its delivery
(R. 95; Section 220.4(c) (5), supra).

Plaintiff only acquired right to
payment when delivery was made to Defendant.
Otherwise, Defendant owed Plaintiff nothing·
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When the trial court entered judgment for
Plaintiff, it could only have done so by
finding at least a constructive delivery
by Plaintiff to Defendant.

Concluding,

as the trial court must have done, either
actual or constructive delivery of the
stock to Defendant, it follows that
Defendant was legal owner thereof.
Plaintiff obtained no consent from
Defendant to liquidate the account (R. 168).
There was no evidence that Plaintiff had
any contractual authority to liquidate
the account.

The applicable Regulation

of the Federal Reserve Board grants a

broker-dealer authority to liquidate a
~ingle

transaction.

Plaintiff failed to

prove a single transaction where delivery
had been made and which had not been paid.

There was no evidence that Plaintiff had
any other authority in law to proceed

26
with liquidation.

Such an unlawful

deprivation by Plaintiff of Defendant's
property, without legal justification
therefor, was a conversion.
~w

Prosser,

of Torts 66 (2d ed. 1955).

The

measure of damages rule applicable to
conversion of securities is set forth
in Western Securities Co. v. Silver
King Consolidated Mining Co. of Utah,

57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664, 672(Utah, 1920).
Defendant is entitled to the fair market
value of the stocks converted within a
reasonable time after he received notice
of the conversion.

Paragraph 4 of the Counter-claim
First Cause of Action lists the various
stocks Defendant fully owned before May 18,
1970, and which Plaintiff sold in its
liquidation without Defendant's consent

or authority (R. 64).

Defendant testified
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that the dollar amounts for each stock in
Paragraph 4 were the fair market values
of the stock within thirty days after the

liquidation sale of such stock (R. 235 &
243).

Defendant's testimony was based

upon actual sales transactions, or actual
trades, within a two week period after
. he first got notice of the liquidation

(R. 243-44).

Using the amounts of stock and fair
market value prices set forth in Paragraph 4

(R. 64), the fair market value unit prices
are:

Classic Mining, 34¢; Investestate,

12¢; Stans bury, 8¢; Agau, $5. 50; King Oil,

43¢.

Using Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-P for
purposes of illustration, it can be seen
that the trial court's award of damages
to Plaintiff was in error.

First, the

shares which were fully owned by Defendant
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when the liquidation commenced (See,
Exhibit 7-P.) should be subtracted
from the stocks scheduled on Exhibit

3-P.

Accordingly, the schedule of

Exhibit 3-P should include only 99,000
shares of Classic Mining, 65, 000 shares
of Inves testate, 7, 100 shares of Agau
I

and no King Oil.

Second, those stocks

in those amounts should be multiplied
by the unit prices referred to above.

Third, after making those adjustments,
the Court must use the remaining amounts
realized from liquidation on Exhibit 3-P,
since the trial court had no other evidence before it.

Following this line of

reasoning, Plaintiff should have received
~85,541.50 from its liquidation.

Sub-

tracting that amount from the $100, 702. 84
which Plaintiff claimed Defendant owed on
Hay 18

'

1970

'

the trial court should have

found Defendant owed $15, 161. 34, less com-
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missions charged on the liquidation in the
amount of $3,106.74, 2 resulting in a net
amount due from Defendant to Plaintiff in
the amount of $12,054.60.

If the Court

concludes that Defendant owed Plaintiff
anything, then that amount, plus interest
at 6 percent per annum from May 19, 1970
to May 11, 1972, in the amount of $1,446.48,
or a total of $13,501.08, should be the

amount awarded Plaintiff on its complaint.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF $6,430.00
DAMAGE TO DEFENDANT ON ITS COUNTER-CLAIM IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
If this Court concludes Plaintiff did
not prove an agreement, or a breach thereof,
then Plaintiff is entitled to no damages.
2The trial court adjusted the final
amount awarded Plaintiff by the commissions charged by Plaintiff on the liguidation. This can be derived by totaling
the individual transaction commissions
Which appear in Exhibits 1-P and 2-D.
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Assuming that conclusion, Defendant would
be entitled to judgment against the Plain3
tiff for $17,980.00, plus interest at 6
percent per annum from May 19, 1970 to

May 11, 1972, in the amount of $2,157.60,
~a

total of $20,147.60 (R. 64

& 235).

Assuming this Court finds there was
a contract and a breach thereof, the Court

should apply the fair market value measure
of damages which is fully described in

Point II, supra.

Following this conclusion,

the $12,054.60 damages to Plaintiff should
be offset against the $20, 137. 60 damages

to Defendant, resulting in a net judgment
to Defendant on May 11, 1972 in the amount
of $8,083.00.

3 Defendant testified the total damages
were $16,980.00 (R. 235~, but t~er~ ~as an
error in addition. Taking the individual
figures pertaining to the stocks in question,
the loss to Defendant was $17, 980. 00 (R. 64) ·
Mr. Prince recognized this mathematical
error (R. 237).
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Finding No. 19 of the trial court
that Defendant was damaged in the amount
of $6,430.00 is palpable error (R. 78).
Defendant testified he had been damaged
in the amount of $16,980.00 [ s i c . -

$17, 980. 00 ] (R. 78).

The trial court

concluded that $6,430.00 was the difference between the fair market value
of the stocks which were fully owned by
Defendant at the date liquidation commenced, and the amounts already realized
through liquidation of such securities.
The only evidence that the trial
court had before it converted amounts
realized

fro~

the sale of Defendant's

fully-owned stock is Exhibit 7-P.

There

is no other controverting evidenc.e about

that point in the record.
Accordingly, the trial court was
comp2lled to find Plaintiff realized
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$9,462.00 from the conversion of Defendant's
stock.

Deducting that amount from the

conversion damages to Defendant in the
amount of $17,980.00, the Court must
find, as appears in Exhibit 7-P, that
Defendant's conversion loss was $8.518.00.
Allowable interest at 6 percent per annum
from May 19, 1970 to May 11, 1972, is
$993.76, making the total due Defendant
$9,511.76 on May 11, 1972, the amount
which the trial court should have awarded
Defendant as an offset against anything
~arded

Plaintiff.

POINT IV
BY

PAYMENT FOR THE SALE OF SECURITIES
PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT IS UNENFORCEABLE.
Section 70A-8-319, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, sets forth the applicable statute of
frauds concerning contracts for sale of
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securities.

Sub-paragraph (a) applies in

cases where the party to be bound signs a
writing.

Plaintiff did not have the

Defendant sign anything (R. 150).

Sub-

paragraph (b) requires that delivery of
a security (See, Section 70A-8-313, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.) be accepted by
the person to be bound.

There was no

evidence of delivery on a single transaction, or the acceptance thereof by
the Defendant.

Sub-paragraph (c) provides

that the party against whom enforcement
is sought must within a reasonable time

after a sale or purchase receive a written
confirmation of said transaction, and
unless he sends the broker-dealer a written
objection to the contents of such confirmation, he is bound by its contents.

Not

a single confirmation of a single transaction was introduced by Plaintiff, though
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David E. Nelson testified that all of them
could have been pulled (R. 224).

Further,

he testified that a confirmation was mailed to a customer on every trade in the
usual and ordinary course of business

(R. 222).

He did not testify that con-

firmations were mailed to Defendant,
and no confirmations were produced on
transactions of Defendant.

There was

no testimony that Defendant.received
one confirmation.

Sub-paragraph (d)

provides that if the party sought to be
bound "admits in his pleading, testimony
or otherwise in court that a contract
was made
----

for a sale of a stated quantity

of described securities at a defined or

stated price the statute of frauds
requirement would be met. 11

There was

no admission by Defendant in pleading,
testimony, or otherwise, that (1) a
contract was made,

(2) that there was
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a stated quantity on a given transaction
(3) that the securities of such transaction
were described, and (4) that there was a
defined or stated price as to such security,
or securities.

CONCLUSION
Defendant acknowledges that he had
an account with Plaintiff.

There was

some evidence that Defendant had a
special cash account with Plaintiff.
However, Plaintiff's evidence was that
about April 10, 1970, Defendant's account
was converted to a COD account.

The

federal law permits a broker-dealer
to handle individual transactions on
a COD basis, but compels strict accounting for such transactions, separate
recording of special accounts, specific
authorization on transactions where there
is an understanding between broker and
customer, prompt delivery of the security
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in question to the customer, and full
cash payment for the security upon delivery.
All of Plaintiff's evidence indicated
there were no segregation of accounts
and it was candidly admitted that both
the usual special account transactions
and the COD transactions were all handled in one account.

All of Defendant's

stock was kept in one folder, without
segregation.

There was no evidence

about any understandings between the
parties on any transaction, about
delivery of stocks on any transaction,
about cash payment from Defendant on
any transaction, or about any other
specific term or terms of an account
or transaction agreement.
One major difference between the
usual special cash account transaction
and the COD transaction is that a brokerdealer has seven business days in which
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to collect from a customer on the usual
special cash account transaction, and
thirty-five calendar days in which to
collect from a customer on the COD
transaction.

Since Plaintiff saw fit

to lump everything together in one
account, without any specific segregation, it is impossible for the Court
to determine what, if anything, Defendant might have owed Plaintiff.
It is respectfully submitted that
Plaintiff, to avoid meeting Defendant's
substantial and meritorius defense
which had application to one kind of
transaction but not the other, consciously
changed its position.

In so doing, it

was unable to prove its case.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse
the trial court on any relief granted
Plaintiff

and should modify the relief
'
granted on the counter-claim, awarding
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Defendant the full relief sought in the
counter-claim First Cause of Action.
Costs and attorney's fees should be
awarded Appellant-Defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH RIGTRUP
466 East 5th South,
Suite 101
,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Counsel for Appellant

Received two copies of this APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

this~~-day

of December, 1972.

FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR.
Prince, Yeates, Ward, Miller
and Geldzahler
455 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent

